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The Obama Administration and The Middle East: A Symposium
unlikely, particularly given the U.S.
predisposition toward pushing for a Syria-Iran
split. Nevertheless, we do not know where
Obama is going to come down.
Regarding Israel-Palestinian issues, looking
at developments on the ground, it is difficult to
see this as being a good time for making any
progress on the Palestinian track. Still, there
will be a new Middle East coordinator in this
administration, and there is, I think, a
predisposition to push on this track. I have a
hard time seeing this as an initial priority of
the administration given other pressing issues.
Nevertheless, I think the Obama
administration will have an ambitious agenda.
Its focus on diplomacy and coalition-building
will benefit from a tremendous amount of
international goodwill, at least initially, as
well as the belief he can bring “hope” and
“change.” But I think that within a year,
Obama, too, will have to deal with the realities
of the Middle East.
*David Schenker is a senior fellow and
director of the Program on Arab Politics at
The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy. Previously, he served in the Office of
the Secretary of Defense as Levant country
director. He is author of Palestinian
Democracy and Governance: An Appraisal of
the Legislative Council (2001).
THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY, OIL, AND
THE MIDDLE EAST
John S. Duffield*
During
the
presidential
campaign,
candidate Barack Obama described America’s
dependence on oil as one of the greatest
challenges that the country has ever faced. He
said that high oil prices threatened to drag
down the U.S. economy. The transfer of
wealth to oil-producing countries, “many of
them hostile to our interests,” was viewed as a
threat to U.S. national security. And the
combustion of oil, along with other fossil
fuels, posed a serious threat to the

environment. 1
The campaign hinted that an Obama
presidency would seek energy independence.
But with regard to oil, it established and
emphasized a much more specific and
presumably achievable goal. Within 10 years,
the United States would save more oil than it
currently imports from the Middle East and
Venezuela combined.
What would the achievement of this goal
actually entail? According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, the United States
consumed approximately 20.7 million barrels
per day (mbd) of oil in 2007. That same year,
it imported 2.17 mbd from the Persian Gulf (of
which Saudi Arabia provided more than twothirds) and 1.36 mbd from Venezuela. If North
Africa is included in the Middle East--since
Libya and Algeria provide another 0.7 to 0.8
mbd of petroleum--U.S. imports from the two
regions combined amounted to some 5.0 mbd,
or almost 25 percent of U.S. oil consumption. 2
How would the Obama administration
achieve this goal? The first thing to note is that
it does not actually require reducing U.S. oil
imports from the Middle East or Venezuela,
just reducing consumption by an amount equal
in the size to those imports. Thus, the goal
could be achieved while imports from those
regions remained constant or even increased.
In that sense, the goal is a more realistic one
than attempting to restrict imports from
particular countries. Given the fungible nature
of today’s oil market, it is difficult and
sometimes economically inefficient to do so.
But this reality also underscores the difficulty
of achieving one of the avowed goals of an
Obama energy policy: to reduce the transfer of
wealth to hostile oil-producing countries.
Unless the United States can engineer either a
decline in those countries’ exports or in the
world price of oil, then they will continue to
1

“Barack Obama and Joe Biden: New Energy for
America,”
Uhttp://www.barackobama.com/pdf/factsheet_energy_s
peech_080308.pdfU (accessed November 10, 2008).
2
Energy Information Agency (EIA), Annual Energy
Review 2007, Report No. DOE/EIA-0384 (2007)
(Washington, D.C.: EIA, 2008),
Uhttp://www.eia.doe.gov/aer/pdf/aer.pdfU (accessed
November 10, 2008).
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enjoy large financial inflows.
The Obama campaign emphasized two
main approaches for reducing U.S. oil
consumption: increasing the fuel efficiency of
new vehicles and accelerating the use of
alternative transportation fuels.
To raise fuel efficiency, the Obama
campaign proposed a number of measures.
First, an Obama administration would
increase U.S. fuel economy standards by four
percent per year over a number of years.
Indeed, as a senator, Obama sponsored
legislation to that effect.
Second, the administration would offer $7
billion in tax credits for the purchase of more
fuel-efficient advanced-technology vehicles,
and it would provide $4 billion in loans and
tax credits to domestic auto manufacturers so
that they could retool factories in order to
build more fuel-efficient cars.
Third, the government would invest directly in
research and development in advanced vehicle
technologies, especially batteries, and help to
create a market for such cars by purchasing a
large number of plug-in and all-electric
vehicles. One overall goal would be to put one
million highly fuel-efficient plug-in hybrids on
the road by 2015.
To promote the use of alternative fuels, the
Obama administration would mandate that all
vehicles be manufactured with a flexible fuel
capability by the end of its first term. It would
also invest federal resources into developing
the most promising sustainable alternative
fuels and building the infrastructure to support
them, with the goal of incorporating at least 60
billion gallons of advanced biofuels into the
national fuel supply by 2030. A related
measure would be to establish a low-carbon
fuel standard to speed the introduction of nonpetroleum fuels. Fuel suppliers would be
required to reduce the carbon content of their
fuel by 5 percent by 2015 and by 10 percent
by 2020.
Several other proposed measures, while not
directly aimed at reducing oil consumption,
could nevertheless contribute to the
achievement of that goal or at least to a
reduction in U.S. oil imports. One is a
proposed
economy-wide
cap-and-trade
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program to reduce carbon emissions. If this
came anywhere near to achieving the goal of
an 80 percent reduction below 1990 levels by
2050, it would necessarily result in a
substantial cut in oil use, since the combustion
of oil accounts for roughly half of all U.S.
carbon emissions. Another is the plan to invest
$150 billion over ten years in a clean energy
economy. Much of this money would be
targeted at measures that would result in lower
oil consumption, such as accelerated
commercialization of plug-in-hybrids and
advancing the next generation of biofuels and
fuel infrastructure.
Finally, the Obama administration would
support increased U.S. domestic production of
oil as a means of helping to prevent world
prices from rising higher than they have.
Although greater domestic production would
not contribute to the goal of reducing oil
consumption, it would reduce U.S. oil imports
at least slightly. Nevertheless, the Obama
campaign has been quick to emphasize that,
given its small share of world oil reserves, the
United States cannot drill its way to energy
security.
Given the current state of the U.S.
economy, however, the Obama administration
is likely to put the goal of reducing oil
consumption on the back burner in the short
run. Indeed, policies designed to reduce oil
consumption are likely to conflict with efforts
to halt and reverse the recent economic
downturn, and vice-versa. The Obama
campaign previously proposed an emergency
energy rebate of $500 to $1000, to be paid for
by a tax on oil company profits. The rebate
would offset the increased prices that
Americans have been paying for gasoline and
are likely to pay for heating oil this winter.
But however necessary and well-intentioned,
such a rebate would eliminate some of the
incentive to cut oil consumption, and possibly
reduce money available for investment by oil
companies in exploration and new production
capacity.
Even in the absence of the current
economic crisis, moreover, one could question
whether the policies proposed by the Obama
campaign would be sufficient to achieve the
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goal of reducing oil consumption by 3.5 mbd
within 10 years. For example, the Obama plan
provides no intermediate targets for the
introduction of biofuels. But even the current
renewable fuels standard, adopted in 2007,
would reduce oil consumption by only about 2
mbd no earlier than 2022. And its full
implementation will depend on the
development of cost-effective methods for the
production of cellulosic ethanol and other
advanced biofuels on a large scale, which do
not yet exist.
Likewise, the introduction of more fuelefficient vehicles and those with a plug-in
capability will certainly help to reduce oil
consumption over time. But given that the
higher standards will be achieved only
incrementally and the relatively slow turnover
of the automotive fleet, traditionally about six
to seven percent of vehicles per year, the full
effects will not be felt for more than a decade.
Even the immediate introduction of a million
electric vehicles would reduce gasoline
consumption by only a fraction of a percent,
given that there are already more than 200
million automobiles and light trucks on the
road.
It is worth noting, moreover, that the
Obama plan does not include one measure that
would be particularly effective at reducing oil
consumption: a tax or a price floor to ensure
that oil and gasoline prices remain high
enough to encourage conservation and
investment in alternatives. As recent
experience has confirmed, high oil prices can
have a big effect on consumption patterns. Yet
a tax or price floor need not raise the price of
gasoline as high as $4 per gallon in the short
run in order to alter expectations sufficiently
to induce sustained behavioral change.
Finally, it may be worth asking whether the
goal of the Obama plan is sufficient or
ambitious enough. Even a 17 percent
reduction in oil use would leave U.S.
consumption levels, whether measured in
terms of GDP or population, well above those
of most other advanced industrialized
countries. At least in the longer term, the
United States will probably have to reduce
consumption by an even greater amount in

order to mitigate the negative economic,
environmental,
and
national
security
consequences of its oil dependence.
What implications could the Obama plan
have for U.S. policy toward the Middle East?
With the principal exception of the domestic
responses to the oil shocks of the 1970s, U.S.
policy has traditionally emphasized the use of
foreign policy tools to address the concerns
raised by American oil dependence, especially
high oil prices and potential supply
disruptions. As articulated during the
presidential campaign, however, the Obama
energy plan contains no explicit external
dimension.
In the short term at least, the implications
are likely to be minimal for two reasons. First,
as noted above, until the United States
emerges from the current economic crisis, the
new administration will emphasize saving jobs
and promoting growth rather than reducing oil
consumption. If anything, the ready
availability of inexpensive oil will be seen as a
means to that end, and the administration is
likely to work as necessary with sympathetic
producers like Saudi Arabia to keep the price
of oil in the low to moderate range.
Second,
long-term
concerns
about
maintaining stability in the Middle East for the
sake of energy security have been at least
temporarily eclipsed by the immediate
challenges posed by Iraq and Iran. Although
the evolution of the political situation in Iraq
and the outcome of Iran’s alleged efforts to
become a nuclear power will have potentially
profound consequences for regional stability
and thus the ability of the Persian Gulf to meet
the world’s oil needs, the new administration
will have to address these pressing issues on
their own terms and necessarily give less
consideration to the longer-term implications
for energy security.
Once these immediate domestic and
international concerns have been addressed,
however, the Obama administration will have
to turn its attention to the question of what
type of relationship it wants with the oilproducing countries of the Middle East and the
degree to which U.S. policy should be shaped
by concerns about maintaining reliable access
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to adequate supplies of oil at reasonable
prices. Even if the Obama administration is
successful in reducing U.S. oil consumption
by 17 percent or even more, the United States
will continue to import oil from the Persian
Gulf. More importantly, the rest of the world-and the health of the global economy--will
remain heavily dependent on stable and
perhaps even rising production levels in the
region. Thus it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for even an administration
committed to change to break with the longstanding imperative to intervene in the region
in order to ensure energy security.
*John S. Duffield is Professor Political
Science at Georgia State University in Atlanta.
He is the author of Over a Barrel: The Costs
of U.S. Foreign Oil Dependence (Stanford
University Press, 2007) and co-editor (with
Peter J. Dombrowski) of Balance Sheet: The
Iraq War and U.S. National Security (Stanford
University Press, forthcoming 2009). His
current research focuses on the politics of
energy security in the United States and other
industrialized countries.
WHAT OBAMA SHOULD DO ABOUT
RUSSIA IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Mark N. Katz*
Formulating an American foreign policy
with regard to Russia in the Middle East will
be complicated because some things Moscow
is doing there are harmful to American
interests while others are either not harmful or
actually helpful.
Moscow’s actions that are most harmful to
American interests are its continued support
for the Iranian nuclear program, and protecting
it in the UN Security Council, as well as its
arms sales to both Iran and Syria. Though less
of an immediate threat, Russian cooperation
with Middle East gas producers such as Iran,
Qatar, and Algeria to form a “Gas OPEC”
could have a negative economic and political
impact on the West.
By contrast, Moscow’s actions that are
either not harmful or are actually helpful
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include: cooperating to some extent with U.S.
and European efforts to prevent Iran from
obtaining nuclear weapons, not providing Iran
and Syria with the more advanced weapons
systems that they want, and not supporting
America’s opponents in Iraq or Afghanistan.
In addition, Moscow maintains good relations
not just with Arab governments allied to the
United States but also with Israel--a far cry
from its behavior during the Cold War when
the USSR actively sought to weaken or even
overthrow these governments.
What the Obama administration obviously
hopes for is that Moscow will cease those
actions harmful to American interests while
continuing those that are either helpful or not
harmful. What it fears is that Moscow will
continue or increase those actions that are
harmful while ceasing those actions that are
either helpful or not harmful.
Moscow, though, is not likely to do what
Washington either hopes or fears, but continue
its current policy instead. Among other
reasons, supporting Iran and Syria is valued by
Russia because America opposes it.
Supporting them in defiance of the United
States makes Russia appear to be a great
power--not least in its own eyes. By contrast,
ceasing to do so, especially at America’s
behest, would make Russia look weak and
subservient at least in its leaders’ own selfperception.
On the other hand, even if RussianAmerican relations deteriorate further than
they already have, Moscow is unlikely to
pursue policies that undermine America’s
Arab allies or Israel. For while Moscow sees
America as an opponent, it also sees radical
Sunni Islamism as one. The more powerful the
latter grows in the Middle East, the more it
can do to undermine Moscow’s rule in the
Muslim regions of Russia (including the
northern Caucasus and Tatarstan). ProAmerican Arab governments, Israel, and even
the American presence in Iraq and
Afghanistan (so long as this continues) serve
to keep these forces at bay. Despite its
resentment toward the United States, the
Kremlin has no interest in weakening their
ability to perform this function.
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